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Chapter 9
International Legal Positivism and Legal
Realism
D. A. Jeremy Telman

1. Introduction
The initial encounter between Legal Realism and Legal Positivism
in the United States did not go well.1 During the first half of the
twentieth century, Legal Realism came to dominate the legal
academy in the United States. Although they shared many
assumptions with Legal Positivism, Legal Realists utterly ignored
Kelsenian legal positivism, seeing it as a version of the various
formalisms that Legal Realism had rejected. HLA Hart’s
positivism was largely quarantined in jurisprudence courses far
from the core of professional training that is the main mission of
law schools in the United States.
But twentieth century Legal Realism has itself come to seem
rather quaint. Its early practitioners aspired to a social scientific
approach, but they lacked the requisite empirical and
methodological tools. In the past decade, a New Legal Realism has
emerged, and its practitioners are as a group more philosophically
sophisticated and more familiar with empirical social scientific
methods than were the original Legal Realists. Perhaps as an
inevitable by-product of globalisation, some US academics have
attempted to apply the New Legal Realism to international law,
and since positivism is a far greater force in the academic
discourse relating to international law than it is in the domestic
context, international law becomes the realm in which a dialogue
between the new Legal Realism and Legal Positivism becomes
both inevitable and necessary.

1

Anthony J Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (CUP 1998)
1–2 (fn.6).
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This chapter is a contribution to that dialogue. It begins with two
background sections that describe the initial encounter between
Legal Realism and Legal Positivism in the US academy and the
elements of the New Legal Realism, including examples of New
Legal Realist approaches to international law. In a third section,
this chapter notes that the New International Legal Positivism
(NILP) holds out great promise for specifying the nature of
international legal norms and the potential limitations on the
efficacy of such norms. With its forthright embrace of the
inescapability of uncertainty in law, the NILP adopts a sceptical
position very similar to the Legal Realism. However, the NILP still
requires a New International Legal Realist supplement in order to
provide a fuller understanding of the way in which legal norms
interact with non-legal factors and to help us describe, predict and
analyse the behaviour of actors in international affairs. At the same
time, New International Legal Realists can learn from the sceptical
attitude towards sources of law developed by the New
International Legal Positivists. The two movements can be
symbiotic if brought into closer dialogue. Nonetheless, this section
concludes with a dose of pessimism about the capacity of any of
the currently available theories of international law to fully
assimilate the complexities of both postmodern theory and
postmodern global society into a comprehensive theory of
international law in the postmodern world.

2. Legal Realism and Positivism
In the United States, the home of Legal Realism, the positivist
tradition is largely represented through the work of HLA Hart and
various responses thereto.2 The vast majority of American
academics, to say nothing of law students and practicing attorneys,
are unfamiliar with the work of Hans Kelsen, and most of those
familiar with it have little good to say about it. This section
2

Sebok treats the legal process school, especially as represented by Herbert
Wechsler’s ‘neutral principles’ approach and the originalist movement that
followed from it, as a variant of legal positivism. Sebok, note 1 at 113–216.
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proceeds in three parts. After a quick review of the basic themes of
Legal Realism, the section addresses the reasons why Hans
Kelsen’s legal theory found no footing on American soil. Finally,
the section will briefly address the very different reception that
HLA Hart’s positivist legal theory received in the world of Legal
Realism.
2.1 Elements of Legal Realism
As Brian Leiter has noted, many who write about Legal Realism
reject the notion that there is any core coherence to the movement.3
The movement, if it can be so called, consisted of a diverse group
of legal scholars4 committed to the view that legal decision-making
turned on ‘something other than, or at least much more than,
positive law, legal rules, legal doctrine and legal reasoning as
traditionally conceived’. However, there was no consensus as to
what that ‘something’ was.5
Nevertheless, intrepid scholars, including Leiter, claim to
identify as the twin hallmarks of Realism two forms of rulescepticism: the view that legal rules are a myth because law
consists only of the decisions of courts, and the view that statutes
and other legislative creations are too indeterminate to constrain
judges or govern their decisions.6 This may be so because
individual rules are indeterminate or because multiple rules are
available and legal decision-makers are unconstrained in choosing
among them.7 Brian Tamanaha has summarised Realist
perspectives as committed to the views that: 1) the law is filled
with gaps and contradictions and thus is indeterminate; 2) every
legal rule or principle has exceptions and thus precedents can
support different results; and 3) judges decide cases based on their
personal preferences and then ‘construct the legal analysis to
3

Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (OUP 2007) 16.
4
Michael Steven Green, ‘Legal Realism as a Theory of Law’ 46 William and
Mary Law Review (2005) 1915–2000 at 1919.
5
Frederick Schauer, ‘Legal Realism Untamed’ 91 Texas Law Review (2013)
749–780 at 756.
6
Green, note 4 at 1917–1918.
7
Schauer, note 5 at 750 (fn. 2).
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justify the desired outcome.’8 Brian Leiter reduces Realism still
further to a ‘core claim’ about judicial decision-making: ‘judges
respond primarily to the stimulus of facts.’9
2.2 Legal Realism and Kelsen’s US Reception
The US legal academy’s rejection of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law
was over-determined. Kelsen’s lack of influence in the United
States is best understood as a product of four phenomena that
relate only tenuously to the substance of Kelsen’s theories. They
are: Legal Realism’s hostility to anything smacking of formalism;
the general view that positivism was too politically anaemic to
stand up to the challenges to the rule of law in the twentieth
century; the incompatibility of Kelsenian and common law
approaches to adjudication; and the nature of US law schools as
relatively a-theoretical training grounds for professionals rather
than scholars.
First, before Realism arrived on the scene, US legal scholarship
had been dominated by a formalist concept of law, which stressed
‘the purported autonomy and closure of the legal world and the
predominance of formal logic within this autonomous universe’.10
Realism defined itself in opposition to this idea of law,11 and
Kelsen’s approach must have appeared to the Realists to be a
version of the formalism that they had just energetically rejected
and were in the process of eliminating from legal pedagogy and
legal doctrine.
Second, Kelsen’s theory failed political litmus tests because,
although Kelsen personally supported parliamentary democracy,
his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him to avoid
connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory.12
As early as 1946, Gustav Radbruch declared that positivism had
8

Brian Tamanaha, Beyond The Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of
Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press 2010) 1.
9
Leiter, note 3 at 21.
10
Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ 57 Toronto Law Journal
(2007) 607–660 at 611.
11
Dagan, note 10 at 612.
12
Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Bonnie L
Paulson, Stanley L Paulson (trs), Clarendon Press 2002) 3.
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rendered the German legal profession defenceless against laws
with arbitrary or even criminal content.13 Lon Fuller, one of the
most influential philosophers of law in the United States during
Kelsen’s lifetime, concluded that legal positivism had helped pave
the way for the Nazi seizure of power. In a 1954 essay, Fuller
wrote that the Nazis ‘would never have achieved their control over
the German people had there not been waiting to be bent to their
sinister ends attitudes towards law and government that had been
centuries in the building’. These attitudes included being
‘notoriously deferential to authority’ and having ‘faith in certain
fundamental processes of government’.14 In a 1958 exchange with
HLA Hart, Fuller declared positivistic philosophy incompatible
with the ideal of fidelity to law.15 At a time when fascism and
totalitarianism posed genuine threats to the ascendancy of
democracy as the global model for governance, Kelsen’s theory
did not seem to US academics to provide a sufficiently robust
defence of democracy or for sufficient safeguards against abuses of
the law by fascist or totalitarian governments.
Kelsen faced and continues to face two additional problems in
the United States legal academy relating to issues of pedagogy and
the nature of legal education. The first problem is that legal
education in the United States is a form of professional training.
Students did not – and still often do not – come to law school in
search of enlightenment. They come in order to get the skills, the
professional credentials and the contacts that will enable them to
succeed in their chosen profession. Theorising about the nature of
the law occurs at the margins of the law school experience, with
most students taking only one or two classes during the course of
their legal educations that focus on jurisprudence. In addition,
common law legal education is a very practical affair, in which the
students engage intensively with the case law. Kelsen’s highly
abstract and theoretical approach to the law could not have been
13

Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ 1
Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung (1946) 105–108 at 107.
14
Lon L Fuller, ‘American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century’ 6 Journal of
Legal Education (1954) 457–485 at 466–485.
15
Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’
71 Harvard Law Review (1958) 630–672 at 646.
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more alien to the way in which US students are inculcated into
legal doctrine. Untethered as the Pure Theory of Law is to any
concrete examples drawn from familiar cases or even statutes, it
had almost no chance of appealing to students in US law schools.
Given the development of legal education in the United States as
a form of professional training, with jurisprudence sequestered in a
tiny corner of the curriculum, Kelsen’s approach was unlikely to
have much appeal for US lawyers-in-training. Although the recent
Carnegie report on legal education faults law schools for focusing
on teaching doctrine at the expense of ethical formation,16 students
actively resist the latter and crave the former. Even if students were
inclined towards theory, most do not arrive at law school with the
sort of analytical skills that would enable them to understand,
much less appreciate, Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law.
2.3 Legal Realism and Hartian Legal Positivism
Until relatively recently, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism were
routinely viewed in the American academy as incompatible.17
Brian Leiter has argued otherwise.18 It may be that the two
jurisprudential approaches, while perhaps not incompatible, are
concerned at their core with different questions. Legal Positivism
attempts to explain what law is, and Legal Realism attempts to
understand how judges decide cases – in particular how they
decide the relatively rare ‘hard case’.19 If that is so, then Legal
Realism exists as a supplement to Legal Positivism, illustrating
how law works at the margins (or penumbra) of clear legal rules
whose ‘core’ meaning is routinely enforced and adhered to.20
However, some defenders of Legal Realism argue that the effect of
its insights into the nature of law and legal processes cannot be so
16

William M Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of Law (Jossey–Bass 2007) at 144.
17
Leiter, note 3 at 59.
18
Leiter, note 3 at 80.
19
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 136–147; Karl Llewellyn,
‘Some Realism about Realism’ 44 Harvard Law Review (1931) 1222–1264 at
1239.
20
HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ 71 Harvard
Law Review (1958) 593–629 at 607–608.
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constrained. As Frederick Schauer has recently observed,
‘[d]etermining whether and when [Legal Realism’s] genuinely
non-traditional and destabilizing version of law’s operation is true
is an empirical question, the pursuit of which is an important part
of future research in the Realist spirit’.21

3. Elements of the New Legal Realism
In an American legal academy in which it has long been a cliché to
observe that ‘we are all Realists now’,22 one might wonder why
there would be a need for a revival of Legal Realism. In fact, the
label New Legal Realism (NLR) seems to refer to two distinct
movements, one of which might be a subset of the other. One
branch of NLR takes up the Legal Realist project, narrowly
defined, as one concerned with what judges do, but the new Legal
Realists are far more proficient in empirical research methods and
thus can far better assess the interplay of law, politics and judicial
personality. More broadly understood, NLR is the methodological
successor to Legal Realism: it applies social scientific and
empirical methods to all of the subject matters with which legal
academics concern themselves and offers solutions with an eye to
promoting progressive social change.
3.1 Inheritance from (Old) Legal Realism
Both variants of NLR see themselves as building on original Legal
Realism by using social science to advance legal knowledge.
Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein describe NLR as ‘an effort to
understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of testable
hypotheses and large data sets’. They view this project as a
realisation of Karl Llewellyn’s goals for Legal Realism.23 In
particular, Miles and Sunstein discuss a body of work that
21

Schauer, note 5 at 780.
Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 (University of North
Carolina Press 1986) 229; Green, note 4 at 1917.
23
Thomas Miles, Cass Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ 75 University of
Chicago Law Review (2008) 831–854 at 831.
22
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attempts, through empirical, quantitative investigation, to specify
the effect of judicial ‘personality’ on legal outcomes, as well as the
institutional contexts that encourage or constrain the effects of
judicial temperament of legal outcomes.24 While the research is not
yet advanced enough to establish robust conclusions, this
scholarship indicates that, for the most part, judicial ‘personality’
comes into play only in the ‘hard cases,’ either because judges are
constrained by law in most cases to rule in certain ways regardless
of their political or ideological orientations, or because the
members of the judiciary are so similar to one another in outlook,
training and core values that they tend to all exercise their
discretion in the same way, while a body more representative of
the general population might produce a greater variety in
outcomes.25 The former explanation tames Realism; the latter
leaves it untamed.26
More broadly understood, NLR employs both legal theory and
empirical approaches in order to both explain doctrine and promote
legal solutions to public policy dilemmas.27 Thus, in a volume of
essays on behavioural law and economics, which Daniel Farber
termed a new form of Legal Realism,28 Cass Sunstein collects
some essays on the effects of heuristics and biases in legal decision
making,29 but most of the contributions take on legal problems
beyond judicial decision-making, such as contract formation, stock
market analysis, vaccination decisions, jury awards, redistributive
effects of legal rights, nuisance law, risk regulation, legal

24

Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 834.
Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 845.
26
‘Tamed’ and ‘untamed’ are Frederick Schauer’s terms for a Realism that
only affects outlier (hard) cases and a Realism that goes to the core of all legal
decision-making processes. Frederick Schauer, note 5 at 749.
27
Howard Erlanger et al., ‘Foreword: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?’
2005 Wisconsin Law Review (2005) 335–363 at 337.
28
Daniel Farber, ‘Toward a New Legal Realism’ 68 University of Chicago
Law Review (2001) 279–303.
29
Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, Amos Tversky, ‘Context-Dependence
in Legal Decision Making’; Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘A Positive Psychological
Theory of Judging in Hindsight’ in Cass Sunstein (ed.), Behavioral Law and
Economics (CUP 2000) 61–95, 96–116.
25
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bargaining dynamics, and tax.30 As Farber notes, like the Legal
Realists, the behavioural law and economics approach seeks ‘to
use the social sciences to understand the behaviour of legal
decision-makers and the effects of legal rules’.31
While Brian Leiter has called into question claims that Legal
Realism actually engaged in empirical research drawing on the
social sciences,32 NLR insists on doing legal scholarship from the
bottom up and from the top down simultaneously by making use of
empirical research as well as qualitative methods and theoretical
insights developed in the social sciences.33 If nothing else, it seems
that NLR is grappling with the challenges of introducing
specialised knowledge and methodology into legal discourse in a
more systematic way than did old Legal Realism.34
NLR also associates itself with a progressive politics, based on
the naive hypothesis that social scientific inquiry into the efficacy
of political structures would yield a progressive critique of those
structures.35 With its combination of empiricism, a call for the
incorporation of social scientific methods into legal scholarship,
and its progressive politics, NLR seems at times like a rebranding
of the Law and Society movement, as both NLR and Law and
Society have been associated with the University of Wisconsin,36
and NLR invokes both pragmatism and the Law in Action
approach, which is also related to Law and Society. 37
3.2 The New International Legal Realism

30

See range of essays in Sunstein, note 29 at 116–186 and 211–421.
Farber, note 28 at 303.
32
Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Realisms Old and New’ available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079810 (accessed XXX) 8.
33
Erlanger, note 27 at 339–340.
34
Erlanger, note 27 at 341–342; Miles, Sunstein, note 23 at 831.
35
Erlanger, note 23 at 344.
36
Four of the six co-authors and co-organisers of the Wisconsin Law Review’s
special issue on NLR were professors of the University of Wisconsin at the time.
37
Erlanger, note 23 at 356–357. Two of the three editors of a large anthology
of Law in Action articles, Stewart Macauley and Elizabeth Mertz are also
University of Wisconsin law professors and key players in NLR. Stewart
Macauley et al., Law in Action: A Socio-Legal Reader (Foundation Press 2007).
31
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Just as NLR can be divided into a narrow and a broad version, the
New International Legal Realism (NILR) comes in two very
different strains. The first is Rationalism, which ranges from a law
and economics to a behavioural economics of international law.
But various normative theories associated with international
relations – Liberalism38 and Constructivism39 –as well as
international legal theories ranging from Harold Koh’s
Transnational Legal Process40 to Paul Schiff Berman’s Global
Legal Pluralism,41 could also be viewed as qualifying as variants of
Legal Realism in international legal theory.42
3.2.1 Rationalist International Legal Theory
While NLR draws broadly on social scientific methodologies
derived from fields like history, anthropology, sociology, and
psychology, Rationalist international legal theory, developed by
scholars like Eric Posner, Jack Goldsmith, Oona Hathaway and
Andrew Guzman, supplements Chicago-school law and economics
with behavioural law and economics while retaining assumptions
associated with traditional International Relations realism.43 While
Rationalism has its roots in NLR, there are subtle differences in the
38

Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press
2004); Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics’ 51 International Organization (1997) 513–553.
39
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism
in Social Theory and International Relations (Routledge 2013); Alexander
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999); Friedrich V
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (CUP 1989).
40
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process After September 11’ 22
Berkeley Journal of International Law (2004) 337–354; Harold Hongju Koh,
‘Transnational Legal Process’ 75 Nebraska Law Review (1996) 181–207.
41
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law
Beyond Borders (CUP 2012).
42
Terminological confusion seems unavoidable. The international law and
international relations theories that I am discussing here as a variant of Legal
Realism are all clearly distinguishable from and in many cases a reaction against
the International Relations realism that has dominated the field in the United
States since the middle of the twentieth century.
43
Andrew T Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice
Theory (OUP 2008); Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, The Limits of
International Law (OUP 2005).
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methodological recipe that lead the NILR to have dramatically
different political valences than NLR.
While NLR is clearly a progressive movement, NILR is
politically diverse, and given the left-wing tilt of the legal academy
generally and of international legal scholarship in particular, this
diversity puts NILR on the conservative end of the scholarly
spectrum. For example, Eric Posner and Miguel FP de Figueiredo
used classic NLR methods to demonstrate that justices of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) exhibit bias towards their own
countries, their countries’ allies and to countries that are, in some
respect, similar to their own countries.44 Posner then follows up
with an argument that, as a result of this exhibited bias, the ICJ has
experienced a decline in its institutional legitimacy, resulting in a
smaller docket consisting of less momentous cases.45 Posner
applies classic Legal Realist methods in service of a revisionist
scholarship at odds with the progressive agenda of both classic
Legal Realism and NLR.46
Rationalist international legal theory focuses on states as the
relevant actors47 assumes that states are unitary actors48 and that
states for the most part pursue their self-interest in the conduct of
their international relations.49 This new Rationalism benefits from

44

Eric A Posner, Miguel de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Justice
Biased?’ 34 Journal of Legal Studies (2005) 599–630.
45
Eric A Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press
2009) 144–145.
46
Oona Hathaway, Ariel Lavinbuk, ‘Book Review: Rationalism and
Revisionism in International Law – Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, The Limits
of International Law’ 119 Harvard Law Review (2006) 1404–1443 at 1406–
1407.
47
Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 3; Guzman, note 43 at 17.
48
Guzman, note 43 at 19; Hathaway, Lavinbuk, note 46 at 1432.
49
Guzman, note 43 at 17; Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 13.
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the long-delayed50 dialogue between international legal theorists
and international relations theorists within the US academy.51
The great advantage of the Rationalist approach to international
law is its parsimony.52 The Rationalist model has very few
working parts; it takes into account only a few variables and thus
seeks to transform international legal theory from a descriptive into
an explanatory and predictive model.53 While Rationalists
acknowledge that non-state actors play a role in international
affairs, they do not consider the role of non-state actors to be so
significant that Rationalist theory needs to take non-state actors
into account in order to explain and predict the course of
international law.54 Rationalist models thus do not account for substate units, multinational corporations and transnational NGOs.55
Rationalists are generally committed to treating states as unitary
actors.56 Rationalist theory associates the preferences of states with
states’ ‘leadership’,57 which usually means the leaders of the
states’ executive branch of government, since that branch has the
dominant role in formulating foreign policy. Rationalist theory
thus downplays the importance of competing factions within the
executive branch, nor does it devote much attention to legislative
input into international law-making or foreign policy decisionmaking. Some Rationalists assume that domestic courts can and
should play no role in shaping international legal rules or
compliance with such rules.58 Finally and not surprisingly,
50

Oona Hathaway, Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International Law
and Politics (Foundation Press 2005); Stephen Krasner, ‘International Law and
International Relations: Together, Apart, Together?’ 1 Chicago Journal of
International Law (2000) 93–99 at 93.
51
Emilie M Hafner–Burton, David G Victor, Yonatan Lupu, ‘Political
Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field’ 106 AJIL (2012)
47–97 at 48.
52
Guzman, note 43 at 21.
53
Hathaway, Lavinbuk, note 46 at 1424.
54
Guzman, note 43 at 8–9; Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 4–5.
55
Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 5; Guzman, note 43 at 21.
56
Guzman, note 43 at 19.
57
Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 6; Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, ‘The
New International Law Scholarship’ 34 Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law 463–484 at 472.
58
Posner, note 45 at 207–225.

International Legal Positivism and Legal Realism

13

Rationalism assumes rationality. ‘Rationality’ here means that
states are guided by their perceived self-interest and not by legal
norms, which Rationalists treat as a product of state interests.59
Rationalists set out to improve the discipline of international
legal scholarship by establishing standards of methodological and
empirical care. Thus like NLR, Rationalism seeks to improve on
the methodological rigor with which Legal Realism is practiced.
Rationalism has clear scientific – or at least scientistic – ambitions.
It aspires to ‘frame claims as testable hypotheses’.60 In order to do
so, it self-consciously simplifies the world of international
relations of international law.61 It sweeps aside suggestions that
states might be motivated by considerations other than selfinterest, as well as the perhaps more significant challenges
associated with the maddeningly complex processes whereby
states identify and pursue their interests.
3.2.2 Normative Realist Theory
In this short chapter, it is impossible to do justice to the wealth of
fresh theoretical approaches that have recently emerged in
international legal scholarship. What unites the approaches
addressed here under the rubric of normative NILR is a two-fold
rejection of Rationalism. First, normative NILR rejects the
assumptions that states are unified, rational actors and that one can
either describe international relations or predict behaviour by
focusing exclusively on state action. Second, normative NILR
theorists view legal norms as having an independent valence that
affects the choices of legal decision-makers. In short, normative
NILR looks beyond the maximisation of self-interest in order to
explain how various actors behave on the international stage. As
we shall see in the discussion below, while NILR is in some ways
compatible with positivism, most NILR theorists are traditional
Legal Realists who believe that non-legal factors play a very large
role in the formation, interpretation and (selective) enforcement of

59

Goldsmith, Posner, note 43 at 13.
Goldsmith, Posner, note 57 at 466.
61
Robert Hockett, ‘The Limits of Their World’ 90 Minnesota Law Review
(2006) 1720–1790 at 1724.
60
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international legal rules. Normative NILR also provides useful
insights into the limits of Rationalist NILR.
As its normative NILR critics note, Rationalists generally
promote the advantages of their understanding of international law
vis-à-vis other theoretical models based on their model’s superior
ability to predict state behaviour with respect to international law.62
In practice, however, Rationalism has not established itself as a
useful predictive tool, in part because the Rationalist model often
simply assumes rather than establishes that states are selfinterested, rational actors.63 Rationalists renounce all assumptions
as to the interests that drive state conduct and acknowledge that
generalisation is hazardous.64 Sometimes states are driven by
pursuit of security; sometimes by pursuit of prosperity. Rationalist
theory cannot tell us when one interest will prevail over another or
if we can even know what interest is driving foreign policy.65 As a
result, Rationalists run into difficulties because they are no better
at identifying states’ interests than are international legal scholars
who adopt normative theories. Even when Rationalists focus on
particular case studies, they can offer only ‘reasonable conjectures’
about state interests.66
In addition, NILR scholarship rebuts the Rationalist assumption
that states are the only relevant actors in international affairs by
detailing the range of international agreements and both
international and domestic adjudications to which entities other
than states have been parties,67 while also noting that customary
international law, including customary human rights and
humanitarian law can bind private actors, such as corporations.68
More generally, much of NILR theory recognises that individuals,
62

Hathaway, Lavinbuk, note 46 at 1424; Goldsmith, Posner, note 57 at 473.
Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Book Review Essay: Seeing Beyond the Limits of
International Law – Jack L Goldsmith, Eric A Posner, The Limits of
International Law’ 84 Texas Law Review (2006) 1265–1306 at 1271.
64
Goldsmith, Posner, note 57 at 474.
65
Hockett, note 61 at 1729–1730.
66
Goldsmith, Posner, note 57 at 475.
67
Jordan J Paust, ‘Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the
Pretense of Exclusion’ 51 Virginia Journal of International Law (2011) 977–
1004 at 978–985.
68
Paust, note 67 at 987.
63
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acting singly or in association with others, play in the ‘formation,
reaffirmation, and termination of international law’.69
In its quest for parsimony, Rationalism can simplify the world of
international relations and international law beyond recognition.70
Robert Hockett characterises the dangers of Rationalism as leaving
us with:
[A] world of fetishized, black-boxy Scrooge-states, incomprehensibly
seeking in large part to eat one another, calculating and gaming with
those and with cognate objectives in view, constrained by no more than
the weapons that others possess all while ‘empt[il]y, happ[il]y’ or
mendaciously speaking as if the routines and mere memoranda of
understanding that emerge from this contest were law.71

Rationalists justify their focus on states as the relevant actors in
international law on the ground that doing so in no way hinders
them from developing testable theses that can help predict conduct
in the realm of international affairs. However, Rationalism has yet
to make any testable predictions, and its critics maintain that it is
incapable of doing so in its present form.72 On the other hand,
while critics of Rationalism point out the dangers of a predictive
model that derives from assumptions that may not completely
reflect the complexities and subtleties of international relations,
those same critics acknowledge that their own more complex
models do not so readily generate testable hypotheses and lack
predictive force.73
As a result, NILR, in its two variants, is an incomplete theory of
international law. Rationalism purports to create working models
that can both explain and predict state behaviour, but its models are
so fundamentally flawed as to be of limited value. Moreover, as
normative NILR recognises, by focusing exclusively on states,
Rationalism tells only part of the story of international law’s
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development and impact. Normative NILR provides a far richer
descriptive model of the interaction of the various actors relevant
to an understanding of the workings of international law, but that
very richness prevents normative NILR theorists from articulating
a coherent approach. Focused like Rationalists on the extent to
which international law is an efficacious force in the world, their
models for identifying the mechanisms through which laws are
made and distinguished from non-legal rationales for behaviour
remain underdeveloped.

4. Overlap and Divergence in International Legal
Realism and International Legal Positivism
On the surface, NILR and the NILP seem like irreconcilable
movements. To the extent that NILP is committed to the Kelsenian
project of a Pure Theory of Law, its project is unsullied by the
political, contextual, sociological, psychological, economic, and
ethical considerations that go the heart of NILR. And yet, there are
ways to put the two approaches to international law into
conversation with one another. Just as Legal Realism adopted
positivist assumptions regarding the nature of law and of legal
authority, the assumptions informing NILR put it far closer to
positivism than to natural law theory. Where the two approaches
diverge, that divergence is best understood as a product of the very
different questions that they pose. NILP, like classical international
legal positivism and legal positivism more generally, attempts to
ascertain what law is and whence legal norms derive their
authority. NILR, while informed by positivist notions about the
derivation of legal norms, is far more dedicated to the question of,
to borrow a title from a leading NILR practitioner, how
international law works.74
4.1 Elements of the New International Legal Positivism
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One hesitates to even acknowledge NILP’s existence, as it is
difficult to identify the adherents of the movement. In promoting
formalism in law-ascertainment, Jean d’Aspremont does not offer
a defence of legal positivism as a whole. D’Aspremont gives two
main reasons for resisting the conflation of positivism and
formalism. First, formalism is but one of many tenets of
positivism, not all of which he is willing to embrace. More
importantly, even among themselves, positivists cannot agree on
how to define and delimit their approach to the law.75 For the
purposes of the discussion to follow, we will treat formalism as to
law-ascertainment as a component of NILP while acknowledging
that the approaches are related but distinct.
NILP differentiates itself from classical international legal
positivism for two reasons: new theoretical challenges arose, and
the world changed. Classical international legal positivism
developed at a time when it did not have to respond to Legal
Realism or Critical Legal Studies, as these movements focused
their energies primarily on national legal systems. In the past forty
years or so, as Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont have
noted, critical approaches found their way into the literature on the
nature of international law.76 At the same time, international
relations theory and some international legal theory began to take
note of the significance of non-state actors in world affairs and
began to conceptualise international law in ways that did not treat
states as the sole or even the main relevant actors. These new
conceptions of international law and international relations began
to call the assumptions of classical international legal positivism
into question.
In articulating the characteristics of NILP, Kammerhofer and
d’Aspremont accept arguendo a narrative, according to which
classical international legal positivism was done in by its own
limitations – its focus on states and on the need for state consent to
create binding rules of international law.77 NILP thus adapts the
fundamental positivist doctrine – that law is a human creation to be
75
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evaluated based on its pedigree rather than in respect to moral or
ethical values – to a world in which law-creating authorities and
processes can be diverse, overlapping and contested. This
complicates the positivist project but also adds to its potential as a
descriptive and predictive theoretical model.
NILP is also distinguished from its classical predecessors in its
forthright acknowledgement that the battle against uncertainty is
unwinnable, and in so doing, it adopts sceptical attitudes towards
legal rules that are very similar to those that inform legal realism,
although NILP focuses on a narrower set of sources of uncertainty
in law. NILP poses problems for which it can provide no solutions
in its own terms. NILP elaborates on mechanisms for determining
what the law is, but determining how legal norms and non-legal
norms interact to shape the behaviour of actors in international
affairs is beyond the scope of the NILP project.78 For example,
Jean d’Aspremont acknowledges that his formalist approach to the
ascertainment of law does not reach issues of interpretation.
Moreover, even with respect to law-ascertainment, d’Aspremont
acknowledges that, because of the indeterminacy of language,
‘formalism inevitably brings about some indeterminacy.’79 Jörg
Kammerhofer’s approach helps us to understand the various types
of uncertainty that bedevil our attempts to identify legal norms, but
even if we try to address such uncertainty through a ‘utopian’ act
of will and adopt the Kelsenian Grundnorm theory, ontological
uncertainty will persist.80
As a result of these insights, NILP confronts a familiar,
postmodern world. It does so with a sophisticated version of
philosophical scepticism while working within a tradition that is
for the most part simply modern, as opposed to post-modern. In
some ways, NILP’s inheritance from classical Legal Positivism
creates tensions with versions of NILR that have their own
inheritance of Legal Realism’s hostility to anything that smacks of
formalism and to any approach to legal theory that attempts to
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bracket out legal from non-legal reasoning. There is nonetheless a
great deal of overlap in the worldviews of NILP and NILR writers.
4.2 Divergence: Rationalism and the Limits of International
Law
To the extent that variants of Rationalism deny law any
independent valence and insist that states comply with
international law only when doing so accords with the states’
perception of their self-interest, NILR and NILP cannot be
reconciled.81 Similarly, to the extent that NILP dismisses
arguments sounding in pragmatism, political expediency,
effectiveness or Realpolitik as not legal in nature,82 even if NILP
recognises that non-legal arguments may be relevant to legal
outcomes, it rules out any possible dialogue between the two
approaches, unless the parties agree that NILR is a sort of extralegal supplement to NILP approaches.
But NILP also highlights the weakness of Rationalism to the
extent that Rationalism treats law not only as largely irrelevant but
also as largely fixed. Jean d’Aspremont correctly notes that
Rationalism has not had much success in the realm of international
legal theory, even if it is accorded a more respectful audience in
international relations theory.83 Rationalism asks what motivates
states to comply or to fail to comply with legal obligations, but it
rarely takes into consideration the complexities involves in
determining what those legal obligations are. In some ways, NILP
takes the lessons of the ‘untamed Realism’ of the Critical Legal
Studies movement to heart far more than does NILR. NILP more
thoroughly acknowledges the epistemological and ontological
uncertainties that confound our attempts to identify legal norms.84
4.3 Overlap: Normative Theory and the Future of
International Law
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NILR and NILP may be most united in a question that seemed to
divide traditional Legal Realism for earlier variants of legal
positivism. Both are interested in the problem of uncertainty in
international law. NILR looks beyond the law to economic theory,
politics, history and culture in order to explain the ways in which
legal norms arise, develop, and harden into rules or lapse into
something akin to positive morality. NILP seeks to identify the
sources of uncertainty and through both theoretical and legal
mechanisms, reduce uncertainty in the law wherever possible.
A formalist approach seems to limit the possibility that
uncertainties might arise by disfavouring certain types of authority
on which parties might seek to rely in order to create uncertainty
where formal rules are otherwise clear. However, d’Aspremont
defines the concept of ‘law applying authorities’ broadly to include
‘who[]ever, as a matter of social practice, members of the group …
identify and treat as ‘legal’ officials’.85 While d’Aspremont gives
priority to written instruments in the ascertainment of legal rules,86
those written instruments must be understood in light of actual
practice.87 But d’Aspremont seeks to bring the potential cacophony
to order with the aid of his version of Hart’s ‘social thesis,’ which
is informed by the philosophy of language.88 Ultimately, criteria of
law ascertainment are to be looked for in the ‘the converging
practice of law-applying authorities’.89 In short, the existence of
legal rules requires both formal (preferably written) evidence and
some regularity of observation. D’Aspremont avoids specifying the
required degree of regularity, beyond the statement that a feeling
among law-applying authorities that they are applying the same
criteria is required.90 Here, the distance between NILP and NILR
seems to be little more than a matter of where one places the
emphasis in the interplay between words and deeds in the creation
of legally binding obligations.
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Timothy Meyer provides a sort of soft Rationalist NILR
perspective (he calls his approach ‘institutionalist’) on
d’Aspremont’s work.91 Much of Meyer’s review is appreciative of
d’Aspremont’s contributions to our understanding of law
ascertainment, but Meyer rejects d’Aspremont’s distinction
between law and non-law based on formal indicators and argues
that informal signalling mechanisms grant states flexibility and
enhance opportunities for international cooperation.92 Where NILP
attempts to identify and categorise ambiguity in legal rules,
Meyer’s NILR recognises that ambiguity has its uses. Relying on
behavioural studies, Meyer contends that parties inclined to be
law-abiding and risk averse are more likely to comply with fuzzy
rules than with strict ones, as they go out of their way to avoid
even the appearance of non-compliance.93 In addition, Meyer
expresses concern that legal formalism can inhibit dynamism in
international law, and without such dynamism, international law
would remain powerless over non-state actors and over realms of
law (such as international criminal law and international
humanitarian law) where law’s efficacy is greatly reduced if it
cannot regulate the conduct of non-state actors.94 But here too, the
difference might just amount to a matter of emphasis. As Meyer
acknowledges,95 d’Aspremont’s social thesis incorporates the sort
of dynamism that his formalism seemingly undercuts.
Indeed, Meyer brings NILP and institutionalism together
through the shift from traditional legal positivism’s focus on the
intent on the states that were bound by international law to a focus
on the expectations of what d’Aspremont calls law-applying
authorities.96 Meyer restates d’Aspremont’s thesis in
institutionalist terms:
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[I]nternational law is most likely to be effective in generating behavioral
change, not when states act out of a sense of legal obligation, but rather
when there are shared expectations about the kinds of obligations created
by an instrument and what the instrument requires of states.97

NILP may distinguish itself from classical international legal
positivism by the extent to which it acknowledges the limitations
of what can be accomplished through an analysis of law as such.
NILP practitioners are constantly reminding their audience that
their subject matter is law and legal analysis alone. Kammerhofer
repeatedly advises against methodological syncretism in legal
analysis, which he believes would hinder scholarly cognition.98
This is not to discount the importance of other factors that might
affect the behaviour of legal decision-makers, but NILP insists on
drawing clear lines between legal and non-legal analysis.
In fact, NILP requires assistance from non-legal analysis
because it concludes that legal analysis alone cannot resolve legal
issues. For example, Jörg Kammerhofer concedes at the conclusion
of his monograph on Uncertainty in International Law that there is
no possible way of remedying uncertainty through the mechanisms
of legal positivism.99 If the goal is to create a world in which the
application and enforcement of legal norms is stable and
predictable, NILP requires a supplement, but that supplement is
not legal analysis. NILR can provide the necessary supplement, but
in order to do so, it needs to develop a more robust appreciation for
the uncertainty in legal norms that NILP identifies, rather than
treating legal norms as established facts from which international
legal actors depart because they value non-legal considerations
over adherence to legal norms. Just as NILP is in need of a Realist
supplement, NILR needs NILP, as Jean d’Aspremont puts it, ‘for
the sake of the ascertainment of international legal rules and the
necessity to draw a line between law and non-law’.100
Still, one might wonder, if NILP cannot provide any sort of legal
certainty with respect to the specification of legal rules, how its
project could be of use. NILP has the great advantage of bringing
97
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seriousness and rigour to the analysis of how we ascertain legal
rules and identify legal norms. But a rigorous inquiry into these
questions yields only uncertainty, meaning that ultimately the
question of how norms are to be interpreted, what norms are
applicable to a specific legal question, or how to adjudicate
differences in cases of overlapping and seemingly contradictory
norms cannot be answered exclusively with the tools for legal
analysis that NILP provides. Nevertheless, legal questions are
decided, and Legal Realism suggests that such decisions have more
to do with extra-legal factors than with legal positivism’s
ultimately futile attempts to reconstruct legal norms through
recourse to legal analysis alone.
The answer might depend on the pervasiveness of legal
uncertainty. There may be no ultimate answer to the question of
how legal norms are to be recognised, interpreted or reconciled,
but there may be an answer for us. That is, given an actual dispute
and a set of possible outcomes, we may be able to reach a
consensus in many cases, purely on the basis of proper legal
analysis, as to the proper outcome. NILP is extremely useful in
these cases, and then the challenge is to specify the extent of the
world of easy cases. Jean d’Aspremont defends the usefulness of
establishing ‘elementary indicators as to what is law and what is
non-law’. He also notes that indeterminacy is reined in through the
social practice of law-applying authorities.101 Nonetheless, for
‘untamed’ versions of NILR, which would treat all controversies as
‘hard cases’, whether or not legal analysis leads to clarity or
ambiguity is irrelevant, as cases are ultimately decided on nonlegal grounds.
4.4 International Law and the Challenge of Postmodernism
While both NILR and NILP pride themselves on their cognisance
of certain developments in postmodern theory, it is not clear that
international law as a field has really come to terms with the
challenges of the postmodern world. It may well be that the
consequences of postmodernism are simply too destabilising to
incorporate into an approach to law. There is nothing new under
101
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the sun. Postmodern insights were anticipated in earlier thinkers,
going back at least to Heraclitus. If postmodernism is reduced to a
radical form of scepticism, one can accept the claim that Hans
Kelsen’s positivist theory is the epitome of postmodernism.102 But
there are aspects of postmodernism that are far more threatening to
the NILP (and NILR) project.
To the extent that one can generalise about ‘postmodern theory,’
it is safe say that postmodernism is a response to both the
intellectual tradition of structuralism and to the influence of
technology
on
historical
consciousness
and
self103
conceptualisation.
Postmodernism is generally suspicious of
master historical narratives and grand theories of the human
sciences. This skepticism is an abreaction against the teleology and
optimism that came to be associated with Enlightenment
rationality, especially as forms of rationality also became
associated with twentieth century crimes against humanity.104
While structuralism in linguistics and anthropology claimed to
have uncovered the systems of binary oppositions that underlie all
manners of communication, deconstruction is a form of ideologycriticism that focuses both on the distortions created by our mental
habit of thinking in binaries and on the hierarchical and
discriminatory nature of binary oppositions. Deconstruction
challenges legal theory especially forcefully, because binary
oppositions (legal–illegal, guilty–innocent, binding–non-binding,
written–oral, timely–late, substantive–procedural) are the very
stuff of legal systems. Law students are taught to diagram doctrinal
areas through decision trees, each branch of which is a binary
opposition. Still, while a systematic deconstruction of international
law and the international legal system has not been attempted,
critical approaches to international law do incorporate the
scepticism attendant to deconstruction to challenge both binary
102
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oppositions and the hierarchies that are dependent on the binary
oppositions on which the international legal order rests. To the
extent that NILP insists on the usefulness of strict oppositions
between the legal and the non-legal, between writings and conduct,
and between formal and informal processes, it swims against a
postmodern tide. What does international legal positivism look like
in a world where il n’y a pas de hors-texte?105
Post-structuralism also challenges the opposition of structure
and agency. Poststructuralist New Historicists, for example, speak
not of relationships of power and domination but of ‘the circulation
of social energy’.106 This postmodern perspective is a product of
our awareness that we, as human actors, are buffeted by natural
forces that we do not completely understand and cannot control
and by technological forces that we have created and yet also
cannot control. Technological forces are products of human
agency, yet they can become far more powerful than any
individual will. Certain institutionalist forms of NILR have come
to recognise that institutions develop a dynamic of their own,
becoming what Pierre Bourdieu called both ‘structured structures’
and ‘structuring structures’.107 For the most part, however, while
normative NILR expands the players who may interact in
international legal processes and develops complicated models for
their interactions, NILR has not worked out a post-structural theory
of the dialectic of structure and agency in international affairs.
NILP, with its focus on generation of norms, often brackets
questions of structure and agency, as well as the crucial issue of
power, which is at the centre of Foucaultian post-structuralism.
It is therefore unclear that either NILP or NILR truly grapple
with the theoretical and real-world challenges of the post-modern
world. Postmodernism is not a theoretical construct foisted upon an
unsuspected world; it responds to real-world stimuli. In the case of
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international law, those stimuli include the proliferation of
international actors, international law’s pluralist nature, and the
advent of technologies, ranging from cyber-attacks to bitcoins, that
blur, or in some instances, erase distinctions between virtual and
actual phenomena. But postmodernism also challenges us to
interrogate and ultimately move beyond the binary oppositions that
are the building blocks of the ways in which we construct our
understandings of legal systems. It challenges us to think in new
ways about what we might call the circulation of legal energies
through overlapping systems and connections and also to think
about resistances, which may be structural or volitional, to the flow
of legal energies through the network of connections.

5. Conclusion
One can easily imagine a new generation of international legal
scholarship in which the distinctions between realism and
positivism become unimportant compared to the enormous overlap
in perspective among scholars who see themselves as working in
the two supposedly divergent traditions. Both NILR and NILP
have abandoned the exclusive, and in some cases even the primary,
focus on states as the relevant actors in international legal affairs.
While NILP continues to favour some version of formalism, in
which the focus of scholarship is on relatively traditional, hard-law
sources, those sources are understood in a sophisticated manner
that accounts for law generation processes that encompass the
entire realm of social interactions that informs norm creation
domestically and internationally. Most forms of NILR recognise
the importance of formal legal rules, but NILR approaches can
help positivists add new nuance to their understanding of the social
processes underlying the creation of legal norms. While NILR’s
indebtedness to Legal Realism’s enthusiasm for social scientific
and empirical approaches can only help it to enrich the
methodology of international legal scholarship, NILP provides a
philosophical rigor that will protect the field from a form of
empirical fetishism. In any case, increased cross-disciplinary
interaction can only enhance our understanding both of
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international law and of the role international legal scholarship in
not only explaining but also in helping to shape international legal
rules and rule-making processes.

